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Adverse Modification of the Endangered 
Species Act: Regulatory Impediment or 
Tool? 
Chuckie Sullivan 
12 U. MASS. L. REV. 166 
ABSTRACT 
In the past, the agencies charged with the implementation of the Endangered Species 
Act have shirked invoking the full range of regulatory tools at their disposal. They 
altered the structure of the Act in violation of Congressionally-granted authority to 
better accommodate both developmental and conservation interests. After a string of 
critical judicial decisions, the Services finally changed their implementation of the 
Act to parallel the protections envisioned by Congress. Though these changes will 
shift strength between provisions within the Act, they will not drastically alter the 
status quo by allowing the Services discretion in making judgments regarding the 
recovery of listed species and value of cost-benefit analysis. 
AUTHOR NOTE 
I would like to thank the staff of University of Massachusetts Law Review for their 
assistance with this article. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
estruction of habitat is the leading threat to species in North 
America.
1
 Congress was aware of this danger when enacting the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), and included powerful provisions to 
protect endangered or threatened species and their habitats.
2
 In fact, 
some commentators have categorized these provisions as the boldest in 
the entirety of environmental law.
3
 Furthermore, the strongest 
provisions in the Act protect the habitats of endangered species.
4
 The 
Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service 
(“Services”), who are in charge of implementing the law, have 
received judicial backlash for not following the intent of the Act.
5
 The 
Services have recently altered their regulations to better adhere to the 
law in accordance with these judicial objections. Though the question 
remains: do the new regulations follow the fierce spirit of species 
conservation intended by Congress? Furthermore, will the 
implementation of such provisions actually alter the status quo? Or 
will the agencies’ response to judicial mandates just promote form 
over substance? 
This paper argues the new regulatory scheme for adverse 
modification provides the Services with the necessary flexibility to 
customize habitat protection for endangered species, while 
accommodating developmental interest and avoiding political 
                                                          
1
 Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: Untangling and 
Reviving Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 BUFFALO L. 
REV. 1095, 1104 (2010) (citing Amy N. Hagen & Karen E. Hodges, Resolving 
Critical Habitat Designation Failures: Reconciling Law, Policy, and Biology, 
20 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 399, 400 (2006)). 
2
 Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is More in the 
Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
129, 143 & n.65 (2004). 
3
 Sheila Baynes, Cost Consideration and the Endangered Species Act, 90 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 961, 967 (2015) (citing Jonathan H. Adler, Perverse Incentives 
and the Endangered Species Act, Resources for the Future (Aug. 4, 2008), 
available at http://www.rff.org/Publications/WPC/Pages/08 08 04 Adler 
Endangered Species.aspx). 
4
 Robbins, supra note 1, at 1103. 
5
 See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059 
(9th Cir. 2004); Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. United States Fish 
& Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001); New Mexico Cattle Ass’n v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001). 
D 
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backlash. The agencies’ available discretion, however, will shift from 
invoking adverse modification findings to designating critical habitat. 
Part II of the paper will address the legal structure of the Act. Next, 
Part III will address how the Services have interpreted the different 
parts of the ESA. Part IV will then specifically examine specific data 
regarding the Services’ implementation of the adverse modification 
and critical habitat standards. In Part V and VI, the paper analyzes the 
judicial rejection to the Services interpretation of the Act, and the 
corresponding reaction by the Services. Finally, Part VII and VIII will 
predict the impact of these changes and whether they will make any 
difference to the status quo. 
II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY STRUCTURE OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The purpose of the ESA is “to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved.”
6
 The main mechanism to achieve this 
protection is to “list” a species as endangered or threatened.
7
 The 
Services are responsible for making listing determinations and 
enforcing the ESA to protect species on land and ocean.
8
 Such a listing 
invokes a wide-range of strong protections.
9
 
Critical habitat, a protection afforded by Congress to listed species, 
is the only provision of the ESA aimed at promoting recovery, rather 
than just survival, of a species.
10
 The ESA delineates the critical 
habitat of a species to the areas “essential to the conservation of the 
[listed] species and . . . which may require special management 
considerations or protection” and areas outside the current habitat of 
the species “essential for the conservation of the species.”
11
 
                                                          
6
 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2012). 
7
 Id. § 1533(a)(1) (articulating the criteria for listing a species include: possible 
destruction to habitat, overutilization, disease or predation, inadequacy of 
regulatory mechanisms, or other natural or manmade factors affecting a species’ 
continued existence). 
8
 Id. § 1532(15). The Department of the Interior and Department of Commerce 
house the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, 
respectively. 
9
 Id. § 1536(a)(2); id. 1538(a)(1). 
10
 Id. § 1532(5). See Robbins, supra note 1, at 1103–04. 
11
 Id. § 1532(5). 
170 UMass Law Review v. 12 | 166 
“Conservation” under the Act is synonymous with recovery.
12
 Listing 
requires the simultaneous demarcation of a species’ critical habitat, but 
only to “maximum extent prudent and determinable.”
13
 The Services 
may pass on making a critical habitat designation if the lack of data 
makes the underlying scientific requisites impossible to ascertain
14
 or 
“the costs of such exclusion outweigh the benefits.”
15
 Importantly, 




A. Agency Consultations 
Every federal “action” is subject to the ESA under Section 7.
17
 The 
two substantive protections afforded to the Services under this section 
involve minimizing jeopardy to the existence of a species and adverse 
modification of a species’ critical habitat.
18
 These protections differ 
from the prohibition of taking a listed species, which falls under 
Section 9 and additionally applies to all non-federal parties.
19
 
Substantively, Section 7 authority applies to “any action[s] authorized, 
funded or carried out by [a federal] agency” that affect an endangered 
species.
20
 In practice, the Services apply these protections to projects 
undertaken on designated lands which require federal authorization, 
receive federal funding or otherwise have a federal nexus.
21
 The 
                                                          
12
 Id. § 1532(3) (defining “conserve” to mean any method necessary to “bring any 
endangered species or threatened species to the point which the measures 
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary”). 
13
 Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A). 
14
 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2)(i)–(ii) (2012). 
15
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). 
16
 Id. (“The Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . after taking into 
consideration the economic impact, the impact on national security, and any 
other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat.”). See 
New Mexico Cattle Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th 
Cir. 2001); Sinden, supra note 2. 
17
 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
18
 Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
19
 See id. § 1538. 
20
 Id. § 1536(a)(2) 
21
 Andrew J. Turner & Kerry L. McGrath, A Wider View of the Impacts of Critical 
Habitat Designation: A Comment on Critical Habitat and the Challenge of 
Regulating Small Harms, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10678, 10681–82 (2013). 
2017 Adverse Modification of the Endangered Species Act 171 
requirements do not apply to state, local, or tribal projects.
22
 A federal 
agency must consult with the Services to ensure an action does not 
violate either of these standards.
23
 
The Section 7 consultation process protects millions of acres of 
critical habitat.
24
 They usually begin with more informal negotiations, 
allowing interested parties to modify their projects to comply with the 
Services requirements.
25
 These modifications include conservation 
measures that are binding conditions the agency must implement for 
the project to gain approval by the Services.
26
 They also may include 
conservation recommendations, which are non-binding conditions 
protecting the listed species.
27
 Also, even if the Services find no 
jeopardy or adverse modification will occur, they still may deem a 
project to “take” a listed species under Section 9.
28
 In response, the 
agencies issue “reasonable and prudent measures” which the action 
agency must follow to reduce the level of take.
29
 The Services record 
all of the attached measures in a published biological opinion.
30
 The 
adherence to a biological opinion, though not formally binding, is 
“virtually determinative” to whether a consulting agency may proceed 
with an action.
31
 The implementation of these standards, however, is 
very uneven and subject to much judicial review.
32
 
                                                          
22
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (imposing obligations on “each federal agency”). 
23
 See id. § 1536. 
24
 Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 141, 151 (2012) (citing § 1536). 
25
 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., Endangered 
Species Consultation Handbook (1998). 
26
 Owen, supra note 24, at 152. 
27
 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, 
at 4-62. 
28
 Owen, supra note 24, at 152; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE 
FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, at xix (defining to “take” as “to harass, harm, 
pursue hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in 
any such conduct”). 
29
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012). 
30
 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, 
at 4-13–4-14. 
31
 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 170 (1997) (“The Service itself is, to put it 
mildly, keenly aware of the virtually determinative effect of its biological 
opinions.”). 
32
 See Robbins, supra note 1, at 1097-98. 
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III. THE SERVICES’ INTERPRETATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN ADVERSE MODIFICATION, JEOPARDY, AND TAKING 
A proposed agency action cannot (1) jeopardize the continued 
existence of any listed species, or (2) result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of designated critical habitat.
33
 The Services 
consider many different factors to quantify if these events will occur. 
First, the agencies will consider a project’s relation to the species.
34
 
The action agency should include a sufficiently detailed description of 
the action to allow the Services to judge the overall to the surrounding 
ecosystem.
35
 The Services will also weigh the species’ response to a 
proposed action and account for the cumulative effects, which include 
“future [s]tate, tribal, or private actions that are reasonably certain to 
occur in the action area considered in [the] biological opinion.”
36
 
The Services define “jeopardized the continued existence” as 
To engage in an action that reasonably would be 
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably 
the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a 
listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction, 
numbers, or distribution of that species.
37
 
Until 2004 the Services defined “adverse modification” as “a direct 
or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical 
habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”
38
 
Applicable actions altered the biological features that were initially 
used to determine the habitat is critical.
39
 Unlike the factors considered 
                                                          
33
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4). 
34
 This consideration should include the action’s proximity, distribution, timing, 
nature of the effect, duration, disturbance frequency, disturbance intensity, and 
disturbance severity as related to the listed species. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. 
& NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, at 4-23–4-26. 
35
 The Services will analyze the action’s beneficial effects, direct effects, 
interrelated and interdependent actions, and indirect effects. Id. at 4-26–4-29. 
36
 These include the number of individuals and populations the species will affect, 
and the species’ sensitivity to change, resilience, and recovery rate. Id. at 4-30–
4-31. 
37
 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009). 
38
 Id. Judicial intervention forced the Services to change their regulatory definition 
of adverse modification. Infra Section V. 
39
 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
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In the past, the jeopardy and adverse modification definitions were 
nearly substantively identical.
41
 In guidance, the Services attached a 
threshold limitation, finding adverse modification should only exist if 
the action “considerably reduce[d]” both the survival and recovery of 
the listed species.
42
 Given the substantive overlap between the two 
standards, this ambiguous threshold decreased the likelihood of an 
adverse modification finding.
43
 In fact, the Services expressed their 
belief of this overlap through promulgation of past regulatory 
guidance
44
 which has since been reversed through court action in some 
circuits.
45
 As recently as 2010, the Fish and Wildlife Services stated 
that critical habitat adds no additional protections to the benefits of 
jeopardy.
46
 This has come to be known as the “functional equivalence” 
doctrine, and has been subject to much scrutiny by courts and 
commentators.
47
 The Services rarely made a decision solely based on 
an adverse modification finding, given their view of the standard being 
redundant.
48





                                                          
40
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012). The definition of critical habitat in the past 
included qualifying scientific factors of a species’ relationship with a 
surrounding geography known as “Primary Constituent Elements.” See also 50 
C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5) (2009) (including such factors as spawning sites, seasonal 
wetland and dryland, vegetation types, and soil types). These factors have been 
slightly modified in the newly promulgated regulations. Infra Section VI.ii. 
41
 Beginning in the 1980’s, jeopardy was found when an action “directly or 
indirectly, [appreciably reduced] the likelihood of both survival and recovery of 
the listed species,” where adverse modification should be found if an action 
“appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival and 
recovery of listed species.” 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5) (2009) (amended in 2016). 
42
 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, 
at 4-35. 
43
 Robbins, supra note 1, at 1098. 
44
 Notice of Intent to Clarify the Role of Habitat in Endangered Species 
Conservation, 64 Fed. Reg. 31,871, 31,872 (June 14, 1999). 
45
 Infra Section V. 
46
 Robbins, supra note 1, at 1106 (citing Critical Habitat, Frequently Asked 
Questions, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/endngered/what-
we-do//critical-habitats-faq.html (last updated June 10, 2010)). 
47
 See Baynes, supra note 3, at 981; Robbins, supra note 1, at 1098. 
48
 Owen, supra note 24, at 166 (finding very few opinions to cite adverse 
modification as the determinative reason for a Services action). 
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analyses included extensive discussion of the action’s potential habitat 
effect. 
One possible reason for this perceived redundancy is the 
unlikelihood of a federal action directly degrading a listed species 
habitat without harming the individual members of the population. 
Some federal projects may adversely modify a habitat, but not create 
enough harm to justify a jeopardy or taking finding to the members of 
the species.
51
 The degradation of unoccupied habitat would likely 
apply to this scenario.
52
 The National Marine Fishery Service provides 
an example of this occurrence with salmonid populations in 
watersheds.
53
 In a guidance document, the agency articulates that 
listed salmonids will “likely” be adversely affected if the baseline 
conditions of their habitat are degraded.
54
 This degradation would 
occur through the presence of “excess fine sediment, high cobble 
embeddedness, or poor pool frequency/quality.”
55
 Although, such a 
finding would not require the presence of the species in the habitat.
56
 
Additionally, federal actions may also adversely modify habitat, but 
have an uncertain effect on the species’ survival, invoking the adverse 
modification standard but not jeopardy or taking.
57
 Determining the 
destruction to an ecosystem is relatively easier than biologically 
quantifying the likelihood of a species’ survival due to a certain 
project.
58
 For example, clear-cutting a small section of forest inhabited 
by a listed spotted owl may have an unclear impact on the individual 
                                                                                                                                         
49
 Id. at 153 (noting that every biological opinion analyzed in the study included 
analysis of the project’s effect on a species habitat). 
50
 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009) (qualifying “jeopardize the continued existence” to 
include effects on a species that could be caused by habitat destruction). 
51
 Owen, supra note 24, at 155. 
52
 See id. 
53
 See National Marine Fisheries Service, Making Endangered Species Act 
Determinations of Effect for Individual or Grouped Actions at the Watershed 








 See id. 
57
 Owen, supra note 24, at 156. 
58
 See id. 
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members of the population.
59
 On the other hand, such an action would 
certainly destroy the owl’s habitat.
60
 In some instances, the availability 




In the past, the functional equivalence doctrine has also enabled 
another assumption by the Services: the baseline doctrine.
62
 This 
doctrine pertains to the Services’ calculation of the benefits associated 
with critical habitat designations.
63
 The baseline approach involves 
“comparing the state of the world without or before the [habitat] 
designation, the baseline, with the state of the world with or after the 
designation.”
64
 Only impacts protected by a critical habitat designation 
above the jeopardy standard would be considered as a benefit, as the 
Services explained in Cape Hatteras
65
 “on occupied critical habitat, 
consultations and project modifications are likely to flow from the 
listing of the species, and no additional consultations or project 
modifications are likely to result as a ‘but-for’ effect of the critical 
habitat designation.”
66
 Since the Services deemed the jeopardy and 
adverse modification standard to be functionally the same (i.e. the 




The Fifth and Ninth Circuits rejected this approach, noting that the 
functional equivalence doctrine effectively cut out the recovery 
standard by only focusing on the survival of the listed species in 
occupied habitat.
68
 The Tenth Circuit, while not directly striking down 
                                                          
59




 See generally id. 
62
 Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. United States Dept. of Interior, 344 F. 
Supp. 2d 108, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
63
 See Baynes, supra note 3, at 990. 
64




 Defendant’s Brief in Opposition at 29, Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance v. 
United States Dept. of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-
217). 
67
 See Baynes, supra note 3, at 978–79. 
68
 Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 
1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. Unites States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
245 F.3d 434, 441–42 (5th Cir. 2001); infra Section V. 
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the regulation, disagreed with the Services’ related reasoning.
69
 The 
D.C. Circuit agreed with the baseline approach without substantively 
considering functional equivalence.
70
 Citing Congress’ prohibition of 
considering costs while listing a species, the court found that the 




IV. THE APPLICATION OF PAST ADVERSE MODIFICATION AND 
CRITICAL HABITAT STANDARDS 
A. Critical Habitat Implementation 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Services used economic 
exclusions to consistently rule against critical habitat designations.
72
 In 
the early 2000s, the agencies changed their approach in response to a 
Ninth Circuit decision striking down the Services’ economic analysis 
approach.
73
 After the pervasion of economic cost-benefit analysis in 
many different areas of federal law, the Services began to attempt to 
monetarily quantify the cost and benefit of critical habitat 
designations.
74
 Most of the Services’ efforts focused on the cost of 
designation.
75
 The agencies’ methodology, however, included multiple 
layers of assumptions, which compounded inaccuracies with estimated 
data.
76
 Their approach included estimating the number of projects to 
occur in the habitat during the next ten years, the resulting Section 7 
consultations and associated project modifications, and the cost of 
such modifications.
77
 These estimates included data from willingness-
                                                          
69
 See New Mexico Cattle Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277, 
1284 (10th Cir. 2001). 
70




 Sinden, supra note 2, at 158. The Services only used economic considerations to 
support a critical habitat designation once in this time period. See generally 
Northern Spotted Owl Critical Habitat Designation, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (Jan. 15, 
1992). 
73
 Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. 273 F.3d 1229, 
1244 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that the baseline utilized by the Services did not 
adequately account for critical habitats added protection). 
74
 See Sinden, supra note 2, at 175. 
75
 Id. at 175. 
76
 See id. at 175–80. 
77
 Id. 
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to-pay surveys—polling Americans as to the amount they would be 
willing to pay to prevent the extinction of a species—and references to 
other administrative guidance documents quantifying economic 
benefits associated with the preservation of similar species.
78
 
B. Biological Opinions’ Inclusion of Adverse Modification 
Professor Owen of the University of Maine School of Law 
completed an extensive analysis of how the Services implemented 
adverse modification protections.
79
 The study includes the review of 
4,000 biological opinions and interviews with agency staff.
80
 Owen 
concluded that, though the adverse modification provisions should 
have a significant independent legal effect, the implementation of the 
standard reflects the Services’ perceived redundancy of the 
provision.
81
 Furthermore, the Services have treated small-scale habitat 
degradation as outside the purview of the adverse modification 
standard.
82
 These problems are compounded by the fact that the 




Within the set of biological opinions analyzed by Professor Owen, 
the Services found jeopardy and adverse modification 7.2% and 6.7% 
of the time, respectively.
84
 Eighty percent of the opinions found taking 
of a listed species to occur, and no jeopardy or adverse modification 
finding.
85
 No biological opinion included adverse modification without 
jeopardy.
86
 Also, critical habitat designations in areas affected by a 
federal project have little impact on the findings articulated in 
biological opinions.
87
 Professor Owen attributes the devaluing of this 
protection to the Services’ classifying most effects on critical habitat 
as minor, and falling below the threshold of “considerably reducing” 
                                                          
78
 Id. at 182. 
79








 Please note, however, that the Services have proposed new regulations 
addressing this void, but have yet to give them effect. See infra Section V. 
84
 Owen, supra note 24, at 164. 
85
 Id. at 166-67. 
86
 Id. at 166. 
87
 Id. 
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both the survival and recovery of the listed species.
88
 Interestingly, the 
Services regularly attributed habitat modification as a partial reason to 
issue a taking finding.
89
 Of the biological opinions examined by 




The Services’ utilization of other protections that indirectly protect 
such habitats somewhat remediate the lack of adverse modification 
findings.
91
 For example, as mentioned above, the Services and 
consulting agencies have many opportunities to revise a project to 
avoid the Services including a jeopardy or adverse modification 
finding.
92
 The Services “almost always” addressed the threat of 
adverse modification through measures mentioned above.
93
 In many 
instances, the Services actually anticipated an overall benefit to the 
area through the use of these measures.
94
 
The threat of degradation to a critical habitat, however, makes little 
difference to the level of protection afforded to a species habitat.
95
 
Owen found little difference among biological opinions involving 
critical habitat and those lacking such designation.
96
 However, some 
subtle effects could exist with the presence of a critical habitat.
97
 For 
example, critical habitat designations slightly increased the likelihood 




                                                          
88
 Id. at 157. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., 
supra note 25, at 4-35. 
89




 Id. at 146. 
92
 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 25, 
at 19-20. 
93
 Owen, supra note 24, at 170. These measures include reasonably prudent 
measures, conservation measures, and conservation recommendations. 
94
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C. Limits of Professor Owen’s Findings 
Professor Owen’s findings, though a nearly complete study of the 
Services’ application of the ESA, does not paint the complete 
picture.
99
 For example, Owen does not account for the preemptive 
effect on land-use interests.
100
 Knowing the existence of a critical 
habitat might change a party’s intended use of the land, and therefore 
provides a selection bias in the examined data set.
101
 Given the extra 
limitations on development within critical habitats, an agency would 
hesitate to propose an action just to be struck down or severely altered 
during the consultation process.
102
 Therefore, the actions analyzed by 
the Services might already be altered by the action agency to avoid an 
adverse modification finding, offering a possible explanation for the 
Services’ lack of such findings.
103
 
The ambiguous meaning of adverse modification might also 
explain the results of Professor Owen’s study. His analysis includes 
small impacts to critical habitat as possibly being considered adverse 
modification.
104
 The Services, however, may only allow for large 
impacts to qualify under the standard, given the large economic costs 
associated with critical habitat designations.
105
 
D. Perceived Amount of Litigation Resulting from Specific 
Biological Opinions 
Professor Owen’s paper also contradicts the unfounded belief of 
some commentators that the consultation process involves extensive 
litigation.
106
 His study only found twenty-six judicial decisions 
specifically invoking the adverse modification prohibition.
107
 To put 
                                                          
99
 Turner & McGrath, supra note 21, at 10679–80. 
100
 See id. 
101
 See id. at 10,679. 
102
 See id. at 10,679–80. 
103
 Owen, supra note 24, at 166. 
104
 Turner & McGrath, supra note 21, at 10,680. 
105
 See Sinden, supra note 2, at 168–174 (commenting on the reluctance of the 
Services to designate critical habitat due to the perceived low extra value 
designation provided for the protection of the species compared to the very large 
cost to construction interests through future Section 7 consultations). 
106
 Owen, supra note 24, at 175. 
107
 Id. at 177. Interestingly, plaintiffs have won these challenges nineteen of the 
twenty-six cases. Id. 
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the small size into perspective, the Services issued 4,000 biological 
opinions between 2005 and 2009 just for fish species.
108
 When the 
courts consider both standards, they treat them as separate issues.
109
 
Adverse modification mostly holds separate legal weight, though its 
invocation differs between jurisdictions.
110
 Professor Owen concludes 
his study by stating that the Services have replaced the adverse 
modification standard with a more discretionary approach, which 
permits the incremental degradation of critical habitat.
111
 He 
postulates, however, that the insertion of discretionary power may be a 
shrewd political move rather than an example of agency capture.
112
 
Through reasonable and prudent measures attached to a project, the 
Services avoid the inflexible structure of the adverse modification 
standard.
113
 Furthermore, they can give concessions to construction 
interests while also attaching caveats to benefit a listed species critical 
habitat.
114
 The main issue heading forward is fitting this flexibility into 
rigid statutorily-mandated factors, which the Services can address by 




                                                          
108
 Id. at 176. 
109
 Id. at 178. 
110
 Compare Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 97-36159, 1999 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3860 (9th Cir. Jan. 11, 1999) (finding the jeopardy standard to fully 
include adverse modification), with Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau 
of Land Mgmt., No. 09–CV–8011–PCT–PGR, 2011 WL 4551175 (D. Ariz. 
2011) (requiring a full recovery analysis in adverse modification finding). See 
Owen, supra note 24, at 178–79 (noting that some courts have criticized the 
Services for allowing incremental habitat degradation, while others have 
explicitly allowed a step-wise relationship to exist between critical habitat 
degradation and adverse modification). 
111
 Owen, supra note 24, at 186. 
112
 Id. at 187. 
113




 See e.g. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (requiring critical habitat to be occupied by the 
listed species, or essential to the conservation of the species and require special 
management considerations). 
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V. COURTS REVIEW OF THE SERVICES’ INTERPRETATION OF THE 
ESA STANDARDS 
Several appellate courts have held that the past standard for 
adverse modification was contrary both to the statute and the 
Congressional intent of the ESA. These cases attacked the prohibition 
of federal actions “appreciably diminish[ing] the value of critical 
habitat to the conservation of a listed species.”
116
 The main issue with 
this standard involved the effective exclusion of the recovery 
protection for listed species. 
A. Sierra Club v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service 
The first case addressing the Services’ standard involved the 
decision not to delineate a critical habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon, a 
listed species.
117
 In its biological opinion, the Services concluded that 
a critical habitat finding would “not provide any additional benefit to 
the species beyond other statutory regimes and conservation programs 
in place.
118
 The Fifth Circuit overruled the decision due to the 
Services’ interpretation of the adverse modification standard, which 
required a decreased chance of both the survival and recovery of a 
species.
119
 This rule effectively read out the consideration of a species’ 
recovery, as recovery is a smaller subset subsumed by survival.
120
 Any 
action that would affect survival would also impact recovery, but the 
reverse was not true.
121
 In its reasoning, the Fifth Circuit referenced 
the Congressional intent of the ESA “to bring any endangered species 
or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided [by 
the ESA] are no longer necessary.”
122
 Furthermore, since the ESA 
defines critical habitat to include areas “essential to conservation” of a 
listed species—and conservation includes more than just survival—the 
Services’ focus solely on the survival of a species was improper.
123
 
                                                          
116
 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2009) (amended in 2016). 
117
 Sierra Club v. Unites States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 245 F.3d 434, 436–37 (5th 
Cir. 2001). 
118
 Id. at 437. 
119
 Id. at 440–41. 
120




 Id. at 438 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2012)). 
123
 Id. at 441–443. 
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B. Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
The Services, however, did not immediately change the adverse 
modification standard. Instead, another case in 2004 forced the 
Services to abandon their old interpretation. Gifford Pinchot
124
 
involved the challenge of six biological opinions permitting the 
harvesting of timber and taking of Northern Spotted Owl in the 
Northwest Forest of Oregon.
125
 The court began by explicitly allowing 
critical habitat modification to be considered in the Services’ jeopardy 
analysis, citing the ambiguity of the ESA as affording the agency wide 
discretion in determining jeopardy findings.
126
 The court then 
addressed the issue of adverse modification applying to both recovery 
and survival of a listed species.
127
 The court noted that the regulations’ 
singular focus became survival because “it is logical and inevitable 
that a species requires more critical habitat for recovery than is 
necessary for species survival.”
128
 Therefore, the agency could 
effectively ignore the recovery of a listed species, which was one of 
the main motivations Congress possessed in enacting the ESA.
129
 The 
Services argued that the protection was implicitly included in their 
issued biological opinions.
130
 The court answered this assertion by 
analyzing each biological opinion involved in the case, searching for 
any references to the recovery standard.
131
 Though the agency briefly 
mentioned the existence of a recovery standard in one biological 
opinion, it did not adequately relate to an adverse modification 
finding.
132
 Consequently, the language of the biological opinion did 
not prove “that the agency [had] . . . ignored their own regulation, 
and . . . considered species recovery.”
133
 
                                                          
124
 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004). 
125
 Id. at 1062–63. 
126
 Id. at 1065–67. 
127




 Id. at 1070. 
130
 Id. at 1072. 
131
 Id. at 1072–75. 
132
 Id. at 1073–74. 
133
 Id. at 1074. 
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VI. SERVICES’ REACTION TO JUDICIAL REJECTION 
A. Adverse Modification Findings 
Due to these cases, the Services disavowed their past interpretation 
of adverse modification in December 2004, and instructed staff to rely 
only on the statutory definition.
134
 After a period of using the 
ambiguous statute, the Services have recently proposed new 
regulations to define adverse modification and critical habitat, which 
the agency finalized in February, 2016.
135
 In the final action, the 
agency amended the interpretation of both standards to more closely 
follow the ESA and separate the adverse modification from jeopardy 
analyses under Section 7.
136
 The new definition of adverse 
modification is a “direct or indirect alteration that appreciably 
diminishes the value of critical habitat for the conservation of a listed 
species.”
137
 In the regulatory guidance for the new rule, the agency 
                                                          
134
 Letter from Marshall Jones, Department of Interior Director, to Regional 
Directors, Department of Interior, Application of the “Destruction or Adverse 
Modification” Standard under Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act 




 See Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of 
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,060 (May 12, 2014); Final Rule on Definition 
of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. 7214 
(Feb. 11, 2016); Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of 
the Endangered Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27052 (May 12, 2014); Final Rule on 
Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 81 
Fed. Reg. 7413 (Feb. 11, 2016); Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the 
Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066 (May 12, 
2014); Final Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the 
Endangered Species Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 7226 (Feb. 11, 2016). 
136
 Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical 
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,061; Final Rule on Definition of Destruction or 
Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7216. The proposed 
and final rule substantively implement the same requirements upon the Service’s 
implementation of adverse modification. In the final rule, the Service only alters 
some minor aesthetic changes to accommodate comments. See Proposed Rule 
on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 79 
Fed. Reg. at 27061; Final Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse 
Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7216. 
137
 Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical 
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,061 (explaining that such alterations “may include, 
but are not limited to, effects that preclude or significantly delay the 
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notes the term “conservation value” is intended to capture the role that 
critical habitat should play in the recovery of a species.
138
 Specifically, 
the rule will accommodate “ephemeral or dynamic habitat 
conditions.”
139
 The Services elaborate that such actions affecting 
recovery include those that “preclude or significantly delay habitat 
regeneration or natural successional processes.”
140
 To interpret the 
magnitude of an impact, the Services will examine the quantity and 
quality of life-sustaining features present in the habitat benefitting the 
recovery of a listed species.
141
 Furthermore, an action’s effect on the 
future generation of these features within a critical habitat will be 
taken into account.
142
 The presence of a listed species within the 




Similarly to the past regulatory framework, once the agency 
determines the conservation value of a habitat, the Services should 
determine whether the action “appreciably diminish[es]” the value of a 
the critical habitat.
144
 The new regulations have removed 
“considerably” from the definition of adverse modification: “to 
considerably reduce the capability” of a habitat to provide for survival 
                                                                                                                                         
development of the physical or biological features that support the life-history 
needs of the species for recovery”). 
138
 Id. at 27,601. Again, the final rule incorporates the proposed rule by only 
making minor changes to word choice. Final Rule on Definition of Destruction 
or Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7216 (“These 
revisions avoid introducing previously undefined terms without changing the 
meaning of the proposed definition.”). 
139
 Final Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical 
Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7217. 
140
 Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of Critical 
Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,061 (stating that such actions would include those 
that affect “food, water, light, shelter from predators, competitors, weather and 
physical space to carry out normal behaviors or provide dispersal or migratory 
corridors”). 
141




 Id. This is one of the main issues raised by eighteen states currently challenging 
the new rule. The states argue that the rule grants the Services unlimited power 
to designate any land critical habitat, regardless of the current presence of any 
ecological functions. See Complaint of Plaintiffs, Alabama v. National Marine 
Fisheries Services, No. 16-953 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2016). 
144
 Id. 
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and recovery.
145
 The agencies reason that deleting the modifier will 
reduce the variability during the consultation process, as 
“considerable” could mean “large in amount or extent” or “worthy of 
consideration.”
146
 Consequently, the central question is now whether 
the reduction of the critical habitat is “appreciable” to the conservation 
value of the critical habitat. The Services have noted that appreciable 
will mean, “to recognize the quality, significance, or magnitude,” and 
not “noticeable” or “meaningful.”
147
 An action’s effect on the entire 
critical habitat’s conservation value will be considered, not just the 
area where an action takes place.
148
 Furthermore, the Services will 
start completing separate jeopardy and adverse modification 
analyses.
149
 The agencies admit, however, the standards could overlap 
depending on whether an occupied habitat contains the necessary 
biological and physical characteristics for the conservation of the listed 
species.
150
 Seemingly, an occupied area not possessing these features 
could only be subject to a jeopardy analysis. 
B. Critical Habitat Designations 
In concurrence with the rule modifying the adverse modification 
standard, the Services have also proposed the altering of critical 
habitat designations.
151
 These changes are important because an 
adverse modification finding requires the presence of a critical 
                                                          
145








 Id. at 27,064. This change will effectively alter the procedure the Services use to 




 See Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating 
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066 (May 12, 2014); Final Rule on 
Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 81 
Fed. Reg. 7413 (Feb. 11, 2016). No substantive differences exist between the 
proposed and final regulations. Final Rule on Implementing Changes to the 
Regulations for Designating Critical Habitat, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7414 (“the 
amendments make minor edits to the scope and purpose, add and remove some 
definitions, and clarify the criteria and procedures for designating critical 
habitat.”). The only substantive definition the Services removed was 
“interbreeds when mature” out of the definition of “species”. Id. at 7424. Other 
changes involve minor, non-substantive details. 
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habitat.
152
 The new rules elaborate the procedures for designating 
critical habitats by following more closely the statutory language of 
the ESA
153
 and clarify the meaning of “geographic area occupied by 
the species” in which the Services may delineate a critical habitat.
154
 
The language of the new rules states that land permanently or 
temporarily used by a listed species during some portion of its life 
would qualify as occupied.
155
 Since Congress articulated that critical 
habitat should be within this area, occupied territory (i.e. the range of a 
listed species) will be more expansive than critical habitat.
156
 
Certain parts of occupied areas may only be designated as critical 
habitat if they possess the “physical or biological features essential to 
the conservation of the species.”
157
 The language mirrors the relevant 
statute to eliminate ambiguity.
158
 These features will be defined as “the 
features that support the life-history needs of the species,”
159
 and do 
not need to be consistently present to be considered essential.
160
 
                                                          
152
 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
153
 Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating 
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,069–70 (May 12, 2014) (citing 16 
§ 1532(5)). 
154
 Id. at 27,068–69 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.02). 
155
 Id. at 27,069 (citing Arizona Cattle Growers’ Assoc. v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 
(9th Cir. 2010) (elaborating that areas of periodic use may include breeding 
areas, foraging areas, and migratory corridors)). To illustrate the periodic 
occupancy, the regulations use an extreme example of cicadas occupying their 
range only one month every thirteen or seventeen years. Id. 
156
 Id. at 27,069 (citing § 1531(5)(A)(i)). The range of the species at the time of 
listing will be used by the Services, unless insufficient data exists to make such 
a determination. In that case, the Services may use current data regarding the 
listed species range. Id. (citing Otay Mesa Prop. L.P. v. DOI, 714 F. Supp. 2d 73 
(D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 646 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
157
 Id. at 27,072 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(b)(1)(iii)). The Services will 
also add “recovery” as part of the meaning of conservation. Id. 
158
 Id. at 27,069 (referencing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (2012) (“on which are 
found those physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of the 
species and (II) which may require special management considerations or 
protection.”)). “Primary Constituent Elements,” the old qualifying factor, has 
been erased from regulations. 
159
 Id. at 27,069. The regulations elaborate many different factors that will define 
the life-history needs of a listed species: “including but not limited to water 
characteristics, soil type, geological features, sites, prey, vegetation, symbiotic 
species, or other features. A feature may be a single habitat characteristic, or a 
more complex combination of habitat characteristics. Features may include 
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Furthermore, the designation of critical habitats will be limited to 
those areas requiring “special management protections.”
161
 Contrary to 
past regulations, the Services will not consider whether a current 
management system exists.
162
 Furthermore, a management system may 
not currently be necessary, but may be implemented to protect against 
future degradation to a critical habitat.
163
 If the essential features are 
not threatened, however, the Services will not find a system necessary 
and will pass on making a critical habitat designation.
164
 Although, the 
agencies expect this to occur infrequently.
165
 
Compared to the past rules, the proposed changes to critical habitat 
designations grant more flexibility to the Services.
166
 For example, the 
Services’ have much discretion to deem threats insufficient to warrant 
a designation, especially if the current threat to a listed species is 
separate from any habitat alterations (e.g. disease).
167
 They can now 
allow construction to occupy an area with listed species as long as the 
species’ life-history needs are not threatened.
168
 Under the proposed 
regulations, the Services will determine the geographic area occupied 
by the species, and then identify the essential features within the 
area.
169
 Furthermore, contrary to the past interpretation of “specific 
areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species” requiring 
the protection of all occupied areas before addressing unoccupied 
habitat, the Services will now consider unoccupied areas concurrently 
with occupied lands.
170
 To accommodate future effects of climate 
change, the Services can designate unoccupied areas that may develop 
                                                                                                                                         
habitat characteristics that support ephemeral or dynamic habitat conditions. 
Features may also be expressed in terms relating to principles of conservation 
biology, such as patch size, distribution distances, and connectivity.” Id. 
160
 Id. at 27,069–70. 
161
 Id. at 27,070 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (2012)). 
162
 Id. (citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (D. 
Ariz. 2003)). 
163
 Id. at 27,070. 
164




 Id. at 27,071–73. 
167




 Id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(1)). 
170
 Id. at 27,073. 
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essential conservation features in the future.
171
 Furthermore, contrary 
to past regulations, the new rules do not require the designation of 
unoccupied habitat only after the exhaustion of a listed species’ current 
range.
172
 Unoccupied habitat, however, must still be considered 
“essential” to the conservation of a species.
173
 
Critical habitat exclusions will also allow the Services more 
flexibility to implement ESA protections,
174
 as Congress only forbids 
exclusions from critical habitat if such exclusion would result in the 
extinction of a listed species.
175
 As mentioned above, one type of 
exclusion is related to economic burdens imposed by a critical habitat 
designation.
176
 As part of this economic analysis, the Services will use 
the baseline method to calculate the benefits and costs of habitat 
designations (i.e. weighing the cost and benefit between a world with 
and without critical habitat designation).
177
 With the new regulations, 
the Services have most likely conformed to external pressures 
                                                          
171
 Id. Recently, eighteen states have challenged this added protection to the rule. 
See Complaint of Plaintiffs, Alabama v. National Marine Fisheries Services, No. 
16-953 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 29, 2016). 
172
 Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating 
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,073 (May 12, 2014). 
173
 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) (“The term ‘critical habitat’ means . . . 
specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species . . . essential 
for the conservation for the species.”) with id. § 1532(5)(A)(i) (“The term 
‘critical habitat’ means . . . specific areas within the geographic area occupied by 
a species . . . on which are found those physical or biological features (I) 
essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may require special 
management considerations or protection.”). 
174
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012) (“The Secretary may exclude any area from 
critical habitat if he determines that the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the 
benefits of specifying such area as part of the critical habitat.”). 
175
 Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered 
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27052, 27,053 (May 12, 2014) (citing 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1533(b)(2) (2012)); Final Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) 
of the Endangered Species Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 7226, 7227 (Feb. 11, 2016) (listing 
the differences from the proposed rule, which are only aesthetic). 
176
 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (The Secretary shall designate critical habitat, and make 
revisions thereto, under subsection (a)(3) on the basis of the best scientific data 
available and after taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on 
national security, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular 
area as critical habitat.”) (emphasis added). 
177
 Final Rule for Revisions to the Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical 
Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,062 (Aug. 28, 2013). 
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regarding monetary judgments, as a recent Executive Order demanded 
the Services give more consideration to excluding private lands from 
critical habitat designations and adopt the least burdensome means of 
promoting compliance with the ESA.
178
 In 2013, the Services began to 
permit the cost-benefit evaluation of critical habitat designation to be 
in quantitative or qualitative terms.
179
 
In more recent regulations, the Services stated that it will consider 
the incremental cost of a critical habitat designation compared to the 
corresponding increase in conservation value, rather than requiring a 
certain monetary threshold to be met.
180
 This incremental approach 
involves calculating the cost of improving the conservation value of 
the habitat, and comparing the cost to the conservation value added 
through designation.
181
 The regulations do not articulate a 




The new regulations deem the presence of partnerships and 
conservations plans between state and local parties to be included in 
the baseline of a proposed critical habitat.
183
 The agencies look very 
favorably on private and other non-federal conservations plans because 
they involve private landowners who otherwise could not be included 
in Section 7 consultations.
184
 The agencies consider any benefits of 
                                                          
178
 Presidential Document No. 2012–5369, 77 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (Feb. 28, 2012). 
179
 Final Rule for Revisions to the Regulations for Impact Analyses of Critical 
Habitat, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,058, 53,060 (Aug. 28, 2013). 
180
 Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered 
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,052, 27,056 (May 12, 2014). As mentioned above, 
the final rule is substantively the same as the proposed. See Final Policy 
Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 81 
Fed. Reg. 7226, 7227 (Feb. 11, 2016). 
181
 Final Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered 
Species Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 7227 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2012)). 
Importantly, this statement codifies the baseline doctrine. 
182
 See id; Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the 
Endangered Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,052 (May 12, 2014). 
183
 Draft Policy Regarding Implementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered 
Species Act, 79 Fed. Reg. at 27,054–55. 
184
 Id. at 27,054–55. The specific plans mentioned in the regulations include habitat 
conservation plan (HCP), safe harbor agreement (SHA), and candidate 
conservation agreements with assurances (CCAA). HCPs accompany incidental 
take permits to accommodate partnerships between non-federal entities 
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critical habitat designation to be minimal due to the existing 
protections afforded by the plans.
185
 
Federal lands do not benefit from such agreements, as Section 7 
consultations must proceed regardless of any existing agreement 
between federal actors.
186
 The Services reason, since any project with 
a federal nexus must complete a Section 7 consultation, one of the 
only benefits from a conservation plan would be to avoid 
administrative or transactional costs associated with the 
consultation.
187
 Avoiding these costs is not a sufficient benefit to 
warrant an exclusion.
188
 The only other benefit from conservation 
plans on lands with a federal nexus comes from avoiding burdens 
associated with adverse modification findings.
189
 To avoid regulatory 
burdens on non-federal lands, the Services plan to focus critical habitat 
designations on federal lands.
190
 
VII. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHANGE 
The Services obviously responded directly to the judicial 
protestations of the recovery exclusion in the former regulations, as the 
agencies include specific language in the new regulation to ensure that 
the adverse modification standard accommodates the recovery of listed 
species.
191
 The Services note that critical habitats outside of the current 
                                                                                                                                         
minimizing impacts to a listed species within its habitat. CCAAs and SHAs are 
agreements to protect listed species on non-federal lands. Id. 
185
 Id. at 27,054. The Services will grant exclusions in such circumstances when 
three conditions are met: (1) The permitted parties are properly executing the 
conservation plan; (2) The conservation plans applies to the species relevant to a 
critical habitat designation; and (3) the conservation plan specifically addresses 
the species habitat and meets the conservation needs of the species. 
186
 Id. at 27,056. Any action on federal land would automatically be considered a 








 Id. This statement does not have large implications, as only projects with a 
federal nexus will be subject to critical habitat designations. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
191
 See Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse Modification of 
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27060, 27061 (May 12, 2014) (to be codified in 
50 C.F.R. § 424.02 (2015)) (“Specifically, the term ‘conservation value’ is 
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occupied habitat of a listed species fall within the purview of the 
adverse modification standard, further promoting recovery.
192
 The new 
rule also separates the jeopardy and adverse modification standards, 
stating the former should focus on critical habitat while the latter 
should focus on the status of the species.
193
 This language seemingly 
overrules the functional equivalence doctrine utilized by the Services 
for many years and rejected by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
194
 
A. How Will the Services Implementation of the Act Change? 
Using the results of Professor Owens’ study, one can raise the 
question of how these changes will be implemented, since the vast 
majority of biological opinions ignore adverse modification.
195
 The 
new regulations have created a large vacuum by effectively 
constructing a new standard under Section 7.
196
 
Two outcomes seem possible: (1) maintain the status quo by 
transferring taking and jeopardy findings focused on habitat 
degradation to an adverse modification label, or (2) enlarge the 
substantive restrictions on federal projects. 
The factors used in past and current adverse modification schemes 
contain no large differences in substantive quality. The conservation 
value sought to be protected in the new regulations is nearly identical 
to the ecological features shielded by the old rules.
197
 To understand 
                                                                                                                                         
intended to capture the role that critical habitat should play for the recovery of 
the listed species.”). 
192
 Id. at 27,062. 
193
 Id. at 27,061. 
194
 See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 
1059, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. Unites States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
245 F.3d 434, 445–47 (5th Cir. 2001). The applicable regulation also contains 
this reasoning. Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or Adverse 
Modification of Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,060, 27,061–62 (May 12, 
2014). 
195
 Owen, supra note 24, at 163-67. 
196
 Id. at 150-152. 
197
 Proposed Rule on Implementing Changes to the Regulations for Designating 
Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,066, 27061 (May 12, 2014) (“The proposed 
definition of ‘physical or biological features,’ described above, would 
encompass similar habitat characteristics as currently described in section 
424.12(b) . . .”); Compare Proposed Rule on Definition of Destruction or 
Adverse Modification of Critical Habitat, 79 Fed. Reg. 27,060, 27,062 (May 12, 
2014) (defining conservation value as the quantity and quality of features to 
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the habitat characteristics that need to be protected, the new 
regulations suggest the Services look to the life-history needs of the 
listed species relied upon in the critical habitat designation, similarly 
to the past regulatory structure.
198
 Consequently, the only differences 
seem to involve the degree, not substance, of the Services’ 
consideration of factors necessary for species protection. The 
threshold’s lowering to include recovery is the largest impact of the 
new regulations. 
It is unclear whether this greater degree of protection 
accommodates the flexibility suggested in Professor Owen’s paper.
199
 
Given that the Services will consider the same substantive factors 
while making adverse modification determinations, but lower the 
threshold (i.e. the inclusion of the recovery standard), one has a 
difficult time predicting whether this will alter the Services’ latitude in 
accommodating both construction and preservation interests. The 
Services note that action agencies do not have an affirmative duty to 
enable the recovery of a species.
200
 Instead, the incorporation of the 
recovery standard only prohibits destructive actions.
201
 Given that 
most consultations result in reasonable and prudent measures that 
benefit the habitat of a species while accommodating construction, the 
new threshold may not detrimentally affect development interests as 
first suspected.
202
 The lower threshold will most likely not 
significantly impact the procedure of the consultation process, as 
concessions can be made to avoid negatively altering the recovery of a 
                                                                                                                                         
support the life-history needs for species recovery) with 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, 
424.12(b)(5) (2009) (amended 2016) (defining the basis of a habitat being 
“critical” to include such factors as spawning sites, seasonal wetland and 
dryland, vegetation types, and soil types). See Services Handbook 4-23–4-31 
(listing factors the agency uses to determine a habitat critical). 
198
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listed species.
203
 These concessions, however, will have to comply 
with the stricter recovery standard.
204
 
Another fairly large concern stems from the lower threshold’s 
effect on critical habitat designations. The inclusion of the recovery 
standard will alter the functional equivalence and baseline doctrines 
upon which the Services relied for most biological opinions.
205
 After 
the approval of the regulation, the adverse modification and critical 
habitat standards are now the only provision protecting recovery.
206
 
Therefore, the functional equivalence doctrine is no longer valid. 
The Services codified the baseline doctrine in the proposed 
regulations.
207
 The extra benefit posed by critical habitat protection 
will now include recovery, differing from listing and jeopardy 
determinations which only focus on survival. The question remains, 
however, as to whether this added benefit will be enough to cause an 
increase in critical habitat designations. Given the Services’ discretion 
in determining the weight of this new addition and possibility of 
adverse modification, the effect on the number of critical habitat 
designations is hard to predict. The Services can now designate 
unoccupied habitat not yet possessing ecological features necessary to 
support a listed species.
208
 As mentioned above, however, the 
proposed regulations will allow the Services much flexibility in 
deciding the economic benefit of a project judged against the added 
conservation value, the size of a project to define the possible scope of 
critical habitat, and the determination of qualifying habitat. Judging 
from the evidence presented in Professor Owen’s paper describing the 
Services as a shrewd political actor, this study conjectures the agencies 
will use this flexibility to compromise between construction and 
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conservation interests, and the amount of critical habitat designation 
will not change dramatically.
209
 
VIII. WILL THE CHANGE MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
The new regulations seem to transfer agency discretion by 
allowing the Services much more flexibility in determining whether 
critical habitat is necessary and lowering the threshold for an adverse 
modification finding. 
The determination of what habitat is “essential to the conservation 
of a species” within an occupied area will be the subject of much 
debate. Although the Services will examine an action’s effect on an 
entire critical habitat to determine adverse modification, critical habitat 
designations will be subject to more discretion. The scope examined 
by the Services may be enlarged or minimized to correspond with the 
presence of biological factors.
210
 To avoid a critical habitat 
designation, the scope of the area considered occupied by a species 
could technically be maximized to prove a certain area is not essential 
to the population’s conservation.
211
 
The Services may also use exclusions to reach foregone 
conclusions in critical habitat designations. The Secretary may invoke 
cost-benefit analysis when he or she chooses.
212
 Costs of making 
habitat improvements will now be compared to the related increase in 
conservation value.
213
 Given that critical habitat is the only ESA 
protection including the recovery of a species, the calculated benefit of 
a critical habitat designations will consist only of the recovery standard 
(i.e. the baseline doctrine). The balancing test will consequently weigh 
the costs of conservation protections with the added value to a listed 
species’ recovery, with both values subject to the discretion of the 
Services. 
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Most importantly, the Services can use qualitative factors in the 
new economic analysis designating critical habitat. The use of these 
factors will not pigeonhole the agencies into attempting to monetarily 
quantify ecological and environmental benefits. Activities that can 
easily be monetized—future construction activities, cost of Section 7 
consultations, etc.—can be quantified and then compared to less 
definite factors, such as the ecological benefit of a species. Policy 
holders can then realistically judge whether the recovery of a species 
in a certain area is worth a calculated amount of money. This 
discretion follows the Congressional intent of the Act,
214
 and grants 
the Services the ability to better judge both construction and 
preservation interests. 
As Professor Owen notes, most projects involve developmental 
interests slightly altering their projects to avoid adversely modifying 
the critical habitat of a listed species.
215
 However, this empirical 
observation requires the presence of already-established critical 
habitat. Given the new stringent adverse modification standard 
incorporating recovery, cunning developmental interests should begin 
preemptively ensuring that projects do not possibly affect an area with 
listed species, irrespective the existence of a critical habitat. Unlike 
adverse modification, critical habitat designations include a cost-
benefit analysis
216
 and incorporate state and local plans conservation 
plans in the baseline.
217
 Since a designation of a critical habitat would 
be easier to evade then adverse modification, a focus on avoiding the 
former would be the best course for developmental interests. Unlike 
adverse modification findings, which arise in Section 7 consultations, 
construction interests will not be externally motivated to recognize the 
importance of critical habitat designations. If developmental interests 
recognize this shift, they could start organizing to ensure projects do 
not significantly threaten a listed species habitat, and avoid any critical 
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habitat designation. Therefore, developmental interest can avoid the 
harsh teeth of the adverse modification standard and construct on their 
own terms, while preserving the recovery and survival of threatened or 
endangered species. 
The Services’ move away from designating unoccupied habitats 
only after maximizing critical habitat in occupied areas may prove the 
most dramatic change in the entire regulations. As mentioned above, 
contrary to past regulations, the Services’ may designate unoccupied 
habitat independent of the designation of occupied habitat.
218
 The 
wording of the ESA regarding the occupied and unoccupied distinction 
is very similar; however, the new regulations do not seem to treat the 
two standards differently.
219
 The Services note that the only difference 
is that “essential” physical or biological features need not be present in 
unoccupied habitat to warrant designation.
220
 
The Services may exploit this fact to designate many unoccupied 
areas not currently holding essential features to dramatically increase 
designations; although, this path seems to eradicate the statutory 
language that separates unoccupied and occupied habitat.
221
 Although 
this change presents a possibility for the Services to dramatically 
increase designations in such areas, the actual implementation of these 
regulations remains unclear. Before the regulations were promulgated, 
the Services noted that informal consultations have started to occur 
more frequently for unoccupied habitat.
222
 These informal 
consultations could prevent construction interests from threatening the 
necessary ecological functions for species conservation. But, the 
Services have also indicated a greater willingness to designate 
unoccupied habitat,
 223
 meaning that the change could not only affect 
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the types of land designated, but also the quantitative amount of 
habitat designated. Similarly, the Services’ intent to protect 
undeveloped physical and biological features in unoccupied habitat 
suggests the agencies plan to designate more land,
224
 rather than just 
different types of land. Eighteen states are currently challenging this 
aspect of the rule in federal court,
225
 so the Services responses in that 
litigation could shed light on their planned implementation. 
Going forward, the change in the Services’ interpretation of the 
adverse modification and critical habitat provisions will be evident in 
certain metrics. If the Services seriously incorporate the recovery 
standard in adverse modification judgments, then areas with already 
existing critical habitats should see a rise in adverse modification 
findings due to the incorporation of the recovery standard. The 
standard will protect the same type of environmental quality as past 
regulations, just to a larger extent. Similarly, if the Services seek to 
minimize the effect of the change, the number of taking and jeopardy 
findings citing the destruction of habitat should decrease to 
compensate for the increase in adverse modification findings. 
On the other hand, the Services will demonstrate their political 
awareness if the rate of critical habitat designations remains constant, 
or even lowers, to compensate for the increase in adverse modification 
findings. Although the Services effectively ignored such designations 
for decades, Congress actually provided much flexibility for the 
standard’s implementation. Consistent with their past strategic 
implementation of the Act, the Services will most likely use all of this 
flexibility, and avoid making too many critical habitat designations in 
order to avoid political backlash. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The change to the adverse modification and critical habitat 
standards present an opportunity for the Services to utilize flexibility 
critical to the proper implementation of the ESA. Instead of 
awkwardly forcing an accommodating regulatory structure by ignoring 
statutory language and entire ESA protections, the Services can work 
within the prescribed structure mandated by Congress. The added 
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discretion also allows the Services to avoid large changes to the status 
quo. Consequently, the new regulations enable the Services to protect 
listed and threatened species while also accommodating 
developmental interests, a necessity in realistic ESA implementation. 
